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Abstract
Many health care systems collect and disseminate information on provider quality in order to facilitate
patient choice and induce competitive behaviour amongst providers. The Department of Health in
England has recently mandated the collection of patient-reported health outcome measures (PROMs)
for the purpose of performance assessment and consumer information. This is the first attempt to
routinely measure the gain in health that patients experience as the result of care and thus offer a more
comprehensive picture of hospital quality than existing ‘failure measures’ such as mortality or readmission
rates. In this paper we test whether hospital demand responds to hospital quality measures based on
health gains in addition to more conventional measures. We estimate hospital choice models for elective
hip replacement surgery using rich administrative data for all publicly-funded patients in the English NHS
in 2010-2012. Our focus is on two key aspects of hospital choice: 1) the extent to which patients are
more likely to choose hospitals which are expected to achieve larger improvements in patients’ health
and 2) whether patients’ response to quality differs with their morbidity, as measured by pre-operative
health status, and other characteristics such as age or income deprivation. In order to address potential
endogeneity bias we implement an empirical strategy based on lagged explanatory variables, hospital
fixed effects and a control group design based on demand for emergency hip replacement. Our results
suggest that hospitals can increase demand by 9% if they increase the average health gains that patients
experience by one standard deviation. Hospital demand has a higher elasticity with respect to average
health gains than emergency readmission or mortality rates. Elective patients are twice as willing as
emergency hip replacement patients to travel further for an increase in quality.
Keywords: Patient choice, hospital demand, demand elasticity, quality of care, health outcomes
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1. Introduction
Many European healthcare systems have recently extended patients’ right to choose their provider of
elective hospital care (Vrangbaek et al. 2012). Enhanced choice can accommodate patients’ preferences
for provider characteristics (e.g. proximity, quality or availability of amenities) and create market conditions
that incentivise providers to compete (Besley and Ghatak 2003). Patients in the English National Health
Service (NHS) have to be referred to inpatient services by their general practitioner, who acts as a
gatekeeper, but are free to choose their preferred provider of care. Prices for hospital care are set
nationally and patients do not bear the cost of treatment, so providers are expected to compete for
elective patients on the basis of quality. Two prerequisites for such quality competition are that patients
and their agents1 have access to reliable, meaningful and understandable information about the quality
of care offered by alternative providers, and that they act upon such information (Besley and Ghatak
2003; Marshall et al. 2004; Faber et al. 2009).
English patients can access comparative information on hospital quality through several channels,
including the NHS Choices website, the Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) website
and the Dr Foster Hospital Guide. These present information on risk-adjusted 28-day mortality and
emergency readmission rates, calculated from routine hospital discharge data. Such indicators have
been criticised as being incomplete and noisy measures of quality, revealing little about the changes in
health that the vast majority of patients will experience as the result of treatment (Appleby and Devlin
2004; Lilford and Pronovost 2010). This is especially so for mortality rates for common elective operations
such as hip (0.3%) and knee replacement (0.2%), which are generally very low (Berstock et al. 2014;
Belmont et al. 2014).
New hospital quality measures that address these concerns are increasingly available. Since April
2009, all providers in the English NHS have been required to collect patient-reported outcome measures
(PROMs) for all NHS-funded patients undergoing unilateral hip and knee replacement, varicose vein
surgery or groin hernia repair (Department of Health 2008). PROMs are validated questionnaires used
to elicit patients’ health status and health-related quality of life (HRQoL)2. Each eligible patient is invited
to complete a PROM questionnaire before and three or six months after their surgery. The changes in
scores can be interpreted as the improvement in patients’ health and are used for hospital benchmarking
(Nuttall et al. 2015; Gutacker, Bojke et al. 2013).
Hospital quality measures derived from PROMs improve over ‘failure’ measures such as mortality or
emergency readmission rates in several ways. First, they capture the entire spectrum of health (Appleby
and Devlin 2004; Gutacker, Bojke et al. 2013) and thus allow inferences about improvements in health as
a consequence of treatment. Second, because post-operative health status is adjusted for pre-operative
status, it can be argued that they adjust better for case-mix. Finally, PROMs reflect the patients’ view
on their health and health improvement. This, one may argue, makes them especially relevant for
prospective patients who are about to choose their provider.
It has been the English Department of Health’s expressed ambition to establish patients’ self-reported
outcomes as an important component of hospital quality assessment. It was also hoped that such
1 These may include the patient’s general practitioner (GP) as well as family, friends and others. Some patients may not be willing or
able to make a choice and their referring GP may choose the most appropriate hospital for them, i.e. the GP acts as an agent to
the patient. It is generally not possible to distinguish between decision makers using administrative data. For simplicity, we will
henceforward denote the decision-maker as the patient.
2 PROMs, such as the EuroQol-5D or the Oxford Hip Score, are widely used in the evaluation of health technologies. The National
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information would be used “by patients and GPs exercising choice” (Department of Health 2008, p.6).
Consequently, provider-specific average risk-adjusted changes in health status have been disseminated
online on a regular basis since the beginning of the national PROM programme (Health & Social Care
Information Centre 2013b). Some patients might access this information directly, whereas others might
rely on their general practitioners, who act as their agent, to retrieve, interpret and communicate this
information.
In this paper we test whether hospital demand responds to PROM-based measures of hospital quality in
addition to more conventional measures such as mortality and readmission rates. We estimate a hospital
choice model for elective hip replacement surgery in the English NHS to identify how hospital choice
responds to hospital and patient characteristics. Our focus is on two key aspects of hospital choice: 1)
whether hospitals with better PROM-derived quality (as measured by the changes in patients’ Oxford
Hip Score (OHS)) face higher demand and 2) whether patients’ response to quality differs according to
their morbidity, as measured by the pre-operative health status, and other characteristics such as age
or income deprivation. To address potential endogeneity we use lagged quality and waiting times. We
also undertake robustness checks using hospital fixed effects and by comparing the effects of quality on
choices by elective hip replacement patients with those by emergency hip replacement patients who we
expect to be less sensitive to quality.
This is the first study which explores whether hospital demand responds to quality as measured by
average patient health gains at provider level, which are derived from patient self-reported outcome
measures. The existing literature has predominantely focused on failure measures such as mortality
rates, either measured at aggregate hospital level or for specific conditions (e.g Sivey 2008; Beckert et al.
2012; Moscone et al. 2012; Gaynor, Propper et al. 2012), readmission rates (Varkevisser et al. 2012;
Moscone et al. 2012), as well as hospital reputation and other composite scores (Pope 2009; Varkevisser
et al. 2010; Varkevisser et al. 2012; Ruwaard and Douven 2014); see Brekke et al. (2014) for an overview.
These studies have typically reported a positive relation between quality and hospital demand. Second,
we make novel use of pre-operative individual level PROMs data to explore such questions as whether
sicker patients travel farther and choose hospitals with higher quality of care as often assumed in the
literature (Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke et al. 2003). Previous studies have either relied on
instrumental variable approaches to approximate the role of (unobserved) pre-operative health status on
demand (Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke et al. 2003) or have used measures of comorbidity
burden and past utilisation as proxies for health status. Our data allow us to explore this issue more
directly. Third, our paper contributes to the small literature on hospital choice in publicly funded health
systems where demand is rationed by waiting time (Sivey 2012; Beckert et al. 2012; Moscone et al.
2012; Gaynor, Propper et al. 2012). Our analysis differs from Beckert et al. (2012), who also study
choice of provider for hip replacement surgery in England, in that we use provider quality measures
which are procedure-specific and more directly related to the quality of care provided3, explore the
role of pre-operative health status, and model the entire relevant market, including private providers of
NHS-funded care.
We find that hospitals with higher PROM scores faces larger demand, and that this effect is unlikely to be
driven entirely by omitted variables. The elasticity of provider demand to average health gains is 1.3 or
3 Beckert et al. (2012) model hospital quality using hospital-wide mortality rates and MRSA infection rates. Aggregate hospital
level quality indicators, such as the summary hospital mortality indicator (SHMI) used in the English NHS, do not correlate well
with hip procedure specific outcome measures (Gravelle et al. 2014). In 2010/11, the Pearson correlation coefficients between
SHMI and the quality measures used in this study were -0.09 (OHS), -0.05 (emergency readmission rate) and 0.10 (mortality rate),
respectively.
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about 34 patients for a standard deviation increase in average OHS. A one standard deviation increase in
hospital average health gains corresponds to a willingness to travel of just over one additional kilometre.
Demand has a higher elasticity with respect to quality measures based on average health gains than
procedure-specific mortality or readmission rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we describe the data used
in this study in more detail. Section 3 describes our econometric model and sets out our strategy to
mitigate potential endogeneity bias. In Section 4 we present the estimated marginal utilities of hospital
characteristics and show how these vary with observed patient characteristics. Section 5 presents the
estimated effects of changes in providers’ quality on their own demand and that of their competitors.
Finally, the last section offers a discussion of the results.
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2. Data
We use patient-level data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for all elective admissions for patients
aged 18 or over who underwent NHS-funded primary (i.e. non-revision) hip replacement surgery4
between April 2010 and March 2013 in NHS or private providers. HES contains rich information on
patients’ demographic and medical characteristics, small area of residence and on the hospital stay.
Privately funded patients treated in the private sector are not included in HES and are excluded from our
analysis5.
We derive four patient variables from HES: patients’ age, gender, the number of emergency admissions
during the 365 days prior to their hip replacement admission, and the number of Elixhauser comorbid
conditions recorded in admissions in the previous year (Elixhauser et al. 1998; Gutacker, Bloor et al.
2015). These are available for all patients. We use the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (Noble et al.
2006) to attribute to each patient the proportion of residents claiming means-tested benefits in their
Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)6, which we interpret as a measure of income deprivation. We measure
a patient’s distance from a hospital as the straight-line distance from the centroid of their LSOA7.
The PROM survey invites all NHS-funded hip replacement patients to report their health status and
HRQoL before and six months after surgery using a paper-based questionnaire. The pre-operative
questionnaire is administered by the hospital either as part of the admission process or during the last
outpatient appointment preceding admission. The post-operative questionnaire is administered by a
central agency and posted to the patient. Participation in the PROM survey is compulsory for providers
but optional for patients. Approximately 60% of patients provide complete pre- and postoperative PROM
questionnaires that can be linked to their HES record (Hutchings et al. 2014; Gutacker, Street et al.
forthcoming).
Each PROM questionnaire contains three instruments: the Oxford Hip Score (OHS), the EuroQoL-5D
(EQ-5D) descriptive system, and the EuroQol Visual Analogue Scale (EQ-VAS). The OHS is a condition-
specific instrument that consists of 12 questionnaire items regarding hip-related functioning and pain
(Dawson et al. 1996). Each item is scored on a five-point scale, with four indicating no problems and
zero indicating severe problems. The overall score is calculated as the sum of all items and ranges
from zero (worst) to 48 (best). Both EuroQol instruments are generic PROMs, i.e. they can be applied
to different health conditions, and are described in detail elsewhere (Brooks 1996). Previous analysis
showed substantial correlation between the EQ-5D and OHS (Neuburger et al. 2013). Since the OHS is a
condition-specific measure and hence plausibly more likely to affect hospital choice for hip replacements
we focus on the OHS throughout this paper.
We use PROMs data in two ways. First, we obtained risk-adjusted hospital-specific PROM change
scores for the OHS from the HSCIC website (Health & Social Care Information Centre 2013b). Data are
4 See Department of Health (2008) for procedure codes. We exclude patients that underwent revision surgery to ensure a more
homogeneous sample and because these are believed to be likely to return to the place of initial surgery, independent of observed
hospital attributes
5 Approximately 11% of the English population have private (supplementary) insurance and approximately 16% of hip replacement
surgeries are funded privately, either out-of-pocket or through private insurance (Hunt et al. 2013; Commission on the Future of
Health and Social Care in England 2014)
6 HES records patients’ locations in terms of the LSOA (2001 census boundaries) in which they reside. Each LSOA contains
approximately 1,500 inhabitants and is designed to be homogeneous with respect to tenure and accommodation type.
7 We determine a hospital’s location on the basis of its headquarter’s postcode (for NHS trusts) or the postcode of the individual
hospital’s site (for ISTCs). We do not model NHS hospital sites individually as quality information for these providers is only
recorded at trust level. This is likely to induce noise to our distance measure.
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reported by financial year, which run from April to March of the next year. The HSCIC excludes from these
reports providers with less than 30 valid pre- and post-operative PROM returns due to concerns about
statistical validity and patient anonymity. The case-mix adjustment methodology is reported elsewhere
(Department of Health 2012).8 There is some evidence to suggest that the hospital-specific mean scores
are robust to missing data (Gomes et al. forthcoming). Second, in some of our models, we use the
information in the individual patients’ pre-operative PROMs questionnaires to measure their pre-operative
morbidity and investigate whether choice of provider is affected by pre-operative morbidity. Because
patients can decline to participate or providers may fail to administer a questionnaire there is scope for
missing data and selection bias, and we explore this in the empirical analysis for the subset of models
which make use of pre-operative morbidity.
We calculate risk-adjusted hospital-specific 28-day emergency readmission and 28-day mortality rates
after hip replacement as additional quality measures. These data are presented on patient information
websites (such as NHS Choices). To compute them, we link our HES data to Office of National Statistics
death records and apply the HSCIC case-mix adjustment as set out in the readmission outcome indicator
specification (Health & Social Care Information Centre 2013a).9
We group providers into seven categories used by the National Patient Safety Agency: NHS small /
medium / large non-teaching trust, NHS teaching trust, NHS specialised orthopaedic provider, NHS
multi-service provider, and NHS Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).10 We also distinguish NHS hospitals from
Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) which are private providers treating NHS patients.
Finally, we derive from HES the median time (in months) that patients in each hospital had to wait
between the specialist’s decision to add the patient to the waiting list and the admission (the inpatient
wait). Patients in the English NHS do not pay for their care directly and waiting times thus serve as a
rationing mechanism (Iversen and Siciliani 2011). We use the median rather than the mean because it
is less affected by a small number of patients with very long wait and thus more representative of the
expected waiting time for a prospective patient. We also conduct sensitivity analysis using the proportion
of patients in this hospital that waited longer than 120 days.
8 The adjustment takes into account a range of patient characteristics including age, sex, pre-operative PROM score, socio-economic
status, comorbidity burden, whether the patient lives alone as well as other indicators of disability.
9 Both readmission and mortality rates are adjusted for age (in 5-yr bands), sex, socio-economic status, comorbidity burden as
captured by the Charlson index and the number of emergency admissions in the last year.
10PCTs are responsible for purchasing care for their resident population and, with the exception of the Isle of Wight PCT, do not
provide care themselves.
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3. Methods
3.1. Model specification
We use a random utility choice model (McFadden 1974). Utility of patient i = 1, . . . , N at provider
j = 1, . . . , J at time t = 1, . . . , T is Uijt = Vijt + ξjt + ǫijt, where Vijt depends on observable hospital
characteristics and travel distance, ξjt are unobserved hospital characteristics, and ǫijt is unobserved
random utility. Patients choose from a set of hospitalsMit ∈ J . Assuming ǫijt is iid extreme value yields
the multinomial logit (MNL) model in which the probability that patient i chooses hospital j is
Pijt = exp
Vijt + ξjt∑
j∈Mit
Vij′ t + ξj′ t
(1)
We assume that all patients who require treatment are treated, i.e. there is no outside option.
In our baseline specification, utility is a linear additive function of the distance from the patient’s residence
to the hospital Dij , distance squared D
2
ij , hospital quality metrics Qjt−1, waiting timeWjt−1, and a vector
of time-invariant hospital characteristics Zj , so that
Uijt = D
′
ijβd,i +D
2
′
ijβd2,i +Q
′
jt−1βq,i +W
′
jt−1βw,i + Z
′
jtβz,i + ξjt + ǫijt (2)
where ξjt and ǫijt are unobserved. We assume that anticipated utility at a provider is based on its
previous period’s quality and waiting time because relevant information are available only with a lag
(see section 3.2). Varkevisser et al. (2012) make a similar assumption. We also estimate models with
contemporaneous waiting time and quality scores in sensitivity analyses.
We allow preferences to vary across patients according to their observed characteristics. Thus the
marginal utility of quality for patient i is
βq,i = βq +X
′
iδq (3)
and similar for distance, waiting time, and other hospital characteristics. All continuous covariates in Xi
are mean centred and base categories for categorical characteristics are set to their mode. Thus, the
vectors of coefficients βd, βd2 , βq, βw, βz reflect the preferences of an average/modal patient, hereafter
referred to as the ‘reference patient ’.
We also estimate models which allow for unobserved patient heterogeneity in tastes over quality, with
βq,i = βq +X
′
iδq + σqαi (4)
where σq is the standard deviation of a normal variable with mean zero and αi is an unobserved patient
effect. The latter may capture, for example, differences in the ability to access and interpret quality
information. This random coefficient multinomial logit (RCMNL) or mixed logit model (Hensher and
Greene 2003; Train 2003), unlike the MNL model, allows for unrestricted substitution patterns, thereby
relaxing the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).11 If σq = 0 then the RCMNL
model reduces to the MNL model in (2).
11The IIA states that the probability of choosing one hospital over another depends solely on the characteristics of these two hospitals
and not on the characteristics of any other hospital. The standard MNL model imposes the IIA assumption, whereas the RCMNL
does not.
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While the MNL model has a closed form solution that can be estimated via maximum likelihood, the
RCMNL needs to be approximated through simulation. To reduce the computational burden12 of the
RCMNL model we assume uncorrelated normally distributed random coefficients for the quality metrics
in Qjt−1 and no random coefficients for other covariates. The RCMNL model is estimated with maximum
simulated likelihood using 50 Halton draws.
All models are estimated in Stata 13 with clogit and the user-written command mixlogit (Hole 2007b).
Standard errors are clustered at the GP practice level to allow for agent-induced correlation across
patients.
3.2. Endogeneity
To interpret βq as an unbiased estimate of the marginal utility of hospital quality (up to a linear trans-
formation) requires that the unobserved hospital effect ξjt is uncorrelated with any of the independent
variables, i.e. all observed variables are exogenous. This assumption may not hold for four reasons
(Varkevisser et al. 2012; Gaynor, Propper et al. 2012; Brekke et al. 2014).
First, hospitals may learn by doing so that higher volume providers have higher quality (Luft et al. 1987;
Gaynor, Seider et al. 2005). Thus changes in demand will also affect quality and induce simultaneity
bias. Based on the institutional context of this study we argue that this concern can be dismissed. While
volume-outcome effects have been reported for elective joint replacement surgery, these scale effects
tend to occur only in very low volume hospitals that treat less than 100 patients per year (Judge et al.
2006; Mäkelä et al. 2011). The increasing incidence of hip replacement surgery in England and trends to
aggregate services in high-volume hospitals mean that all NHS providers in our sample are comfortably
above this threshold and has led commentators to suggest that volume effects are of little relevance in
the English NHS (Judge et al. 2006). For private providers we cannot ascertain their true level of activity
as treatment of non-NHS patients is not recorded in HES, but we expect those to perform a sufficient
number of procedures to operate profitably. The average hospital in our sample treats over 300 patients
per year.
Second, because of short run capacity constraints, changes in demand will also affect waiting time in the
same period (Gaynor, Propper et al. 2012).13 While our primary interest is not in the effect of waiting
time on demand, we are concerned that any bias introduced through endogenous variables will filter
through to our estimate of βq (Wooldridge 2002). However, if, as we assume, demand depends on past,
rather than current, quality and waiting time, then demand changes in period t cannot affect waiting time
at t− 1.
Third, sicker patients may choose higher quality hospitals or hospitals may turn away or discourage
patients with characteristics that make them less likely to achieve a large improvement in health status. If
such systematic selection occurs and is not controlled for in the calculation of hospital quality scores
then those scores would in part be determined by patients’ choices or provider selection. However,
provider quality scores are adjusted for a rich set of demographic, socio-economic, and morbidity patient
characteristics, including, in the case of PROMs, the patients’ self-reported pre-operative health status.
12Even after imposing those constraints the RCMNL model with our baseline specification still took over 5 days to compute on a
high-performance computing system.
13 It may also be that supply and demand are determined simultaneously, i.e. hospitals react to demand shocks by adjusting their
supply, e.g. by performing more surgeries on weekends. We do not consider this in our model explicitly, although the use of lagged
waiting time circumvents this problem as well.
CHE Research Paper 111 8
Hence, we do not believe that unobserved patient selection is likely to bias the quality scores significantly.
Finally, there may be unobserved hospital characteristics that affect demand and are correlated with
observed covariates (Jung et al. 2011). For example, hospitals in areas with better amenities may
attract better staff thereby ensuring higher observed clinical quality but also unobserved interpersonal
aspects of quality. Our assumption that patients use information on previous period quality and waiting
times when choosing hospitals does not remove omitted variable bias operating through unobserved
non-transitory hospital characteristics. However, the low correlations between the PROM quality measure
and the conventional readmission and mortality measures suggest that omitted variables may not lead
to serious bias. We undertake two types of sensitivity analyses to explore the size of the potential
omitted variable bias. Our first approach is to estimate the choice model in (2) with alternative-specific
time-invariant fixed effects (FEs) (Hodgkin 1996; Monstad et al. 2006; Sivey 2012). These hospital FEs
capture the utility of non-transitory unobserved hospital characteristics. The coefficients on observed
hospital characteristics are now identified solely through variation within providers over time, thereby
removing any endogeneity bias operating through unobserved time-invariant characteristics. However,
this approach is quite demanding of the data, and because we only observe providers over three years
we expect this approach to result in imprecise estimates of the marginal utility of hospital quality. Also,
because our market structure changes over time, due to the opening of new independent sector treatment
centres, the FEs do not correspond to observed market shares in each time period. This may bias
estimates if incumbent providers differ systematically from new entries. We therefore also estimate a
model based on NHS trusts only, whose numbers are relatively stable over time.
Our second approach is to follow Pope (2009) (see also Gaynor, Propper et al. (2012)) and gauge
the possible impact of unobserved hospital heterogeneity by using a control group of emergency hip
replacement patients whose choice of provider is less responsive to quality and waiting time. The majority
of emergency hip replacement patients suffer from a fractured neck of the femur as a result of a fall and
official recommendations are that they should be treated within 48 hours (NICE 2011). Further delays
are linked to worse outcomes (Moja et al. 2012). We therefore expect provider choice by emergency hip
replacement patients to be less affected by publicly reported information on quality and more by distance
to providers and time-invariant unobserved factors, such as long-standing reputation or dimensions of
accessibility not captured by our distance measure (e.g. parking charges or connection to the public
transport system).
If we assume that emergency patients’ demand is entirely inelastic to observed quality and they do not
wait14, but value the same unobserved hospital characteristics as elective patients, then their true utility
is given by
UEmerijt = D
′
ijβ
Emer
d,i +D
2
′
ijβ
Emer
d2,i + ξjt + ǫijt (5)
If we estimate the model specified in (2) for emergency patients and find β̂Emerq 6= 0, we conclude
that cov(Qjt−1, ξjt) 6= 0. Moreover, if we assume that elective and emergency patients have the same
preferences for unobserved hospital characteristics, then the effect of quality on elective demand, purged
of omitted variable bias, is β∆q = β
Elec
q −β
Emer
q . Since coefficients in separate MNL models may be scaled
differently, we estimate a pooled model for elective and emergency patients by interacting all covariates
with an indicator variable for emergency. This forces the scaling to be the same. The coefficients on the
14Elective waiting time and associated supply constraints do not apply to emergency patients, i.e. there is always sufficient capacity
to treat an emergency patient. Given the urgent nature of the condition, patients will usually be treated within hours of arrival,
not weeks or months. Explorations of our data revealed that elective waiting time is only weakly correlated with the volume of
emergency patients, suggesting that supply for these distinct groups is separate.
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interaction terms are estimates of β∆k for k ∈ [d, d
2, q, w, z].
If emergency patients are also sensitive to elective quality15, or emergency quality that correlates with it,
or if unobserved hospital characteristics have different effects on choices by emergency and elective
patients and are correlated with observed quality, then β∆q can no longer be interpreted as the unbiased
effect of quality on elective demand. If unobserved hospital factors are not correlated with quality, then
β∆k reflects the differences in preferences in two distinct groups of patients: those that require urgent
care and have less time to compare hospitals, and those that have sufficient time to reach an informed
decision. In this case, we expect that β∆q > 0: elective patients will be more sensitive to quality than
emergency patients.
3.3. Elasticities, changes in demand and willingness to travel
The estimated coefficients on quality are estimates of the marginal utility from quality. Since the utility
function is unique only up to a linear transformation, the coefficients only convey information about the
sign of marginal utility of hospital characteristics and hence about the sign of the effect of quality on
demand. The ratio of estimated marginal utilities (the negative of the marginal rate of substitution) is
unaffected by linear transformations and so provides quantitative and comparable information about
patient preferences. We estimate the reference patient’s willingness to travel (WTT) for a one standard
deviation (SD) increase in quality as
WTT =
∂Dij
∂Qj
|UijSD(Q) = −
∂Uij
∂Qj
/
∂Uij
∂Dij
SD(Q) =
−βq
βd + 2βd2D
SD(Q) (6)
where D is the median distance to hospitals in patients’ choice sets. We estimate standard errors by the
delta method (Hole 2007a). WTT is the extra distance in kilometres that the reference patient located
the median distance away from a provider would be willing to travel to that provider if its quality was
increased by SD(Q), where SD(Q) is averaged across hospitals and years.
We are also interested in whether providers could attract more patients by improving their quality.
Expected demand at provider j is Yjt =
∑
i∈Sjt
Pijt, where Sjt is the set of patients whose choice set
includes provider j, i.e. for whom j ∈Mit. Following Santos et al. (forthcoming) we calculate the average
partial effect of a one SD increase in quality on provider j’s demand, i.e. demand responsiveness to
quality, as
∂Yjt
∂Qjt−1
SD(Q) = SD(Q)
∑
i∈Sjt
∂Pijt
∂Qjt−1
= SD(Q)
∑
i∈Sjt
βqPijt(1− Pijt) (7)
We report the mean of (7) over all providers and years.
We calculate the elasticity of demand of provider j with respect to own quality as
E
Qjt−1
jt =
∑
i∈Sjt
∂Yijt
∂Qjt−1
Qjt−1
Yijt
=
∑
i∈Sjt
βqPijt(1− Pijt)
Qjt−1∑
i∈Sjt
Pijt
(8)
We report the mean of (8), weighted by providers’ predicted demand
∑
i∈Sjt
Pijt.
15As with elective patients, we do not observe who chooses the hospital for emergency hip replacement. This may be the patient, a
family member, GP, or the ambulance crew.
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Finally, we compute the cross-elasticity of demand for provider j with respect to the quality of provider j
′
as
E
Q
j
′
jt =
∑
i∈Sjt∩S
j
′
t
∂Pijt
∂Qj′ t−1
Qj′ t−1∑
i∈Sjt
Pijt
= −
∑
i∈Sjt∩S
j
′
t
βqPijtPij′ t
Qj′ t−1∑
i∈Sjt
Pijt
(9)
with j 6= j
′
. Note that for some combinations of j and j
′
the cross-elasticity is zero because no patients
have both providers in their choice sets.
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4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Our main sample is 173,773 elective hip replacement patients treated in 230 providers during the period
April 2010 to March 2013.16 Their average age is 68 years and 40% are male (Table 1). The average
pre-operative OHS is 17.5 and 9% of patients have been admitted to hospital as an emergency at least
once during the preceding 365 days (average number of admissions = 0.13). Self-reported pre-operative
OHS is only weakly correlated with past emergency utilisation (ρ = -0.10) and the number of comorbidities
(ρ = -0.14). This suggests that past emergency utilisation and comorbidity burden are poor proxies for
current health status17 as experienced by the patient.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - elective sample
Variable Obs Mean SD ICC
Patient characteristics
Distance travelled (in km) 173,773 14.7 17.7
Distance travelled past closest provider (in km) 173,773 5.4 14.8
Number of providers within 10km radius 173,773 1.6 1.7
Number of providers within 30km radius 173,773 8.5 7.3
Age 173,773 68.0 11.5
Male 173,773 0.40 0.49
Past utilisation 173,773 0.13 0.49
Number of Elixhauser conditions 173,773 0.43 0.94
Income deprivation 173,773 0.12 0.09
Pre-operative Oxford Hip Scorea 71,614 17.5 8.2
Provider characteristics
Observed volume 571 304.3 209.1 94.7%
Waiting time (in months) 571 2.5 1.1 77.4%
Change in Oxford Hip Score 571 19.8 1.4 57.0%
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 571 5.65 2.41 36.8%
28-day mortality rate (in %) 571 0.17 0.36 3.4%
Obs = Observations; SD = Standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient.
Notes: Patient characteristics for patients choosing provider between April 2010 and March 2013. Provider waiting
time, change in Oxford Hip Score, readmission rate, mortality rate are for financial years 2009/10 to 2011/12. Provider
characteristics are unweighted.
a Responders to PROM survey that were treated between April 2010 and March 2012.
On average, within 30km patients have a choice of 8 providers, with over 90% of patients having access
to at least two different providers. Even within 10km there are on average 1.6 hospitals and over 20% of
patients can choose between two or more providers. To reduce computational burden we restrict patient
choice sets to the 50 nearest providers. The 741 patients (or 0.04% of the sample) who chose a provider
outside this set were dropped from the analysis.
Patients live on average 14.7 kilometres from their chosen hospital. Figure 1 shows that just over half
(53.7%) of patients bypassed the local hospital and nearly a fifth (18.3%) bypassed the nearest three
16The number of providers varied slightly over this period because of mergers, changes in coding and market entry, especially with
respect to private facilities. There were 157 providers in 2010/11, 202 in 2011/12, and 212 in 2012/13, of which 18 (11.5%) in
2010/11, 62 (30.7%) in 2011/12, and 78 (36.8%) in 2012/13 are privately operated.
17We also calculated the correlations between these measures and the EQ-5D utility score, which one may argue is a more holistic
measure of health-related quality of life. The correlations are similar: ρ = -0.10 for past utilisation, and ρ = -0.14 for comorbidity
burden.
CHE Research Paper 111 12
hospitals. On average, patients travel 5.4 km (SD=14.8) beyond their nearest hospital to be treated.18
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Figure 1: Percentage of elective patients who went to their Nth nearest hospital
The hospital waiting time and quality scores are lagged by one year and are for financial years 2009/10 to
2011/12. The risk-adjusted OHS health again has a mean of 19.8 with a SD of 1.4. There are much larger
coefficients of variation for hospital emergency re-admission and mortality rates. The average waiting
time at provider level is 2.5 months, which is substantially lower than in previous years (see Appendix
Figure A1 and Siciliani et al. 2014). The provider OHS change scores are only weakly correlated with
waiting time (ρ=-0.30), readmission rates (ρ=-0.28) and mortality rates (ρ=-0.05). This suggests that
choice models that are restricted to mortality and readmission rates may not even indirectly pick up the
effect of PROM measures on demand.
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) shows that just over half of the observed variation in OHS is
between providers (ICC=57%) rather than over time. Between-provider variation is markedly greater for
waiting times (ICC=77%). Most of the variation in readmission rates and mortality is within providers.
4.2. Regression results
4.2.1. Main effects
The results from for the RCMNL model (see Appendix Table A1) suggest no significant variation in the
random coefficients on the quality metrics. Hausman tests also did not reject the IIA assumption. We
therefore concentrate on the MNL models reported in Tables 2 to 5.
Table 2 is our preferred specification with distance, lagged waiting time, the three lagged quality metrics
and indicators for the type of provider as well as interactions with patient age, gender, past utilisation,
comorbidity, and local area income deprivation (we explore interactions with pre-operative OHS in
18These numbers are somewhat higher than those reported by Beckert et al. (2012), presumably because our data also cover private
providers treating NHS-funded patients.
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section 4.2.2). This specification does not include hospital FEs. The main effects are the estimated
marginal utilities for the reference patient with mean or modal characteristics. The reference patient
prefers shorter distances with the marginal disutility from distance declining with distance. She prefers
specialised providers to non-specialised providers. She is also more likely to choose a public provider
over a private provider after accounting for distance, waiting time and quality19.
Reference patient demand is increasing with the OHS change score and falling with emergency admission
rates20. The estimated WTT for a one SD increase in OHS is 1.3 km or 8.7% of the average distance
travelled to the chosen provider. The WTT for a SD decrease in emergency readmission rates is 1.0km.
There is no statistically significant effect of procedure-specific mortality rates on demand. Nor does the
waiting time affect choice of provider, which may be a result of the historically short waiting time during
our study period.
Results are robust to the use of contemporaneous rather than lagged waiting time and quality (Appendix
Table A2, model 1). Contemporaneous waiting time has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient.
When we use the proportion of patients waiting longer than 120 days as a waiting time measure the
coefficient is negative and statistically significant (Appendix Table A2, model 2). The coefficients on the
quality measures are almost unaffected by the use of contemporaneous waiting time and quality.
The HSCIC also produces hospital quality scores based on the case-mix adjusted change in the EQ-5D
utility score. This is highly correlated with the OHS change score (Neuburger et al. 2013) and when
we estimate the baseline specification with EQ-5D substituted for OHS we find similar WTT (Appendix
Table A2, model 3). Results are also robust to exclusion of independent sector treatment centres from
patient choice sets (Appendix Table A2, model 4).
4.2.2. Patient heterogeneity
The coefficients on the interaction terms in the lower parts of Table 2 suggest that preferences vary
across types of patient. We find, like other studies (Propper et al. 2007; Beckert et al. 2012), that
older patients dislike distance more. They care less about waiting time and get greater marginal utility
from improvements in the OHS change score, reductions in emergency readmissions and reductions in
mortality rates. There is little difference between the preferences of male and female patients except
that male patients have a greater dislike for providers with higher mortality. Preferences vary little by
morbidity as measured by past emergency admissions. In contrast, patients with more comorbidities
have a greater dislike of distance and waiting time, but care less about readmission rates. Finally, patients
from neighbourhoods with greater income deprivation care more about distance and less about quality.
The existence of detailed patient reported pre-operative health status measures in our dataset allows us
to explore in more detail whether patients in worse health status are more sensitive to quality and more
willing to travel, as commonly assumed in the literature on hospital quality (Gowrisankaran and Town
1999; Geweke et al. 2003). The correlations between patients’ pre-operative OHS and their routinely
available morbidity measures are low, suggesting that they measure different aspects of the patient’s
19During our study period ISTC were funded through block contracts and paid to provide care to a pre-specified number of NHS
patients. However, most ISTCs did not fulfil their quotas although they generally had low waiting times (Naylor and Gregory
2009). Our results are consistent with this observation and suggest a positive preference for public providers by NHS-funded hip
replacement patients.
20We also tested for a non-linear effect of PROM quality on demand by including a squared term for the provider OHS change scores
(Ruwaard and Douven 2014). The square term was statistically significant and negative but there was little difference between the
linear and non-linear models over the observed range of values.
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Table 2: Estimated marginal utilities
Variable Est SE
Main effects
Distance (in km) -0.184 0.002***
Distance2 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.530 0.030***
NHS trust - multi-service -0.603 0.099***
NHS trust - small -0.791 0.038***
NHS trust - specialist 1.023 0.072***
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.033***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.467 0.045***
Primary care trust -1.159 0.206***
Waiting time (in months) 0.013 0.015
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.118 0.008***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.052 0.004***
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.031 0.026
Interaction with distance
x Patient age -0.002 0.000***
x Male 0.002 0.001
x Past utilisation -0.003 0.002
x Comorbidity count -0.004 0.001***
x Income deprivation -0.186 0.017***
Interaction with waiting time
x Patient age 0.003 0.000***
x Male -0.009 0.009
x Past utilisation -0.006 0.012
x Comorbidity count -0.018 0.007**
x Income deprivation 0.046 0.084
Interaction with change in Oxford Hip Score
x Patient age 0.001 0.000*
x Male -0.007 0.005
x Past utilisation -0.010 0.007
x Comorbidity count -0.009 0.003**
x Income deprivation -0.455 0.047***
Interaction with 28-day emergency readmission rate
x Patient age -0.0003 0.000*
x Male 0.000 0.003
x Past utilisation 0.011 0.003**
x Comorbidity count 0.001 0.002
x Income deprivation 0.125 0.026***
Interaction with 28-day mortality rate
x Patient age -0.001 0.001
x Male -0.053 0.022*
x Past utilisation 0.046 0.026
x Comorbidity count -0.009 0.015
x Income deprivation -0.025 0.168
WTT(OHS change) 1.287 0.085***
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.981 0.079***
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.086 0.072
Number of patients 173,032
Number of providers 230
BIC 460,994
Pseudo R2 0.637
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April
2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged by one year.
Coefficients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal utility
of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Interaction terms with distance2 and provider type not
reported (available on request). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
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condition at the time of admission.
The first model in Table 3 is the same as our preferred specification but with additional patient pre-
operative OHS interactions. Interaction terms with other patient characteristics are suppressed for brevity.
Due to data limitations, we focus on patients treated during April 2010 and March 2012. We find that
healthier patients are more willing to travel. Although the marginal utility from higher quality is similar for
healthier patients, the reduced distance cost for these patients implies they are more willing to travel for
higher quality. Healthier patients are also more likely to choose a private provider, which is consistent
with observed differences in intake across provider types (Browne et al. 2008).
The fact that pre-operative OHS data are available for only about 60% of patients raises concerns
about response bias if unobserved factors affect propensity to respond and utility from providers21.
To investigate if responders to the pre-operative PROM questionnaire have different preferences to
non-responders we re-estimate the preferred specification of Table 2 for our full sample (responders
and non-responders) but interact a dummy variable for responder status with all the main and interacted
explanatory variables; pre-operative health status is not modelled.
The pre-operative PROM questionnaire is administered after the patient has chosen the provider. Hence,
it is unclear whether the response indicator variable reflects patient preferences or whether the choice
determines the response indicator. For example, private providers have higher response rates than NHS
hospitals (Gomes et al. forthcoming; Gutacker, Street et al. forthcoming) and also tend to have higher
observed quality and shorter waiting times. We address this concern by including the observed provider
pre-operative response rate as a provider characteristic when modelling the choices of responders and
non-responders. This variable is informative about the individual’s propensity to fill in a pre-operative
PROM questionnaire given the chosen provider22. We find that responders and non-responders have
generally very similar revealed preferences, with the exception of preferences for waiting times (non-
responders prefer shorter waiting times) and PROM quality (responders derive more utility from health
gains and are thus more willing to travel for it). There is no difference with respect to the disutility from
travel distance, readmission rates or mortality.
4.3. Omitted variable bias
We also explore the possible impact of omitted hospital characteristics on our estimates of marginal
utility for quality and other hospital characteristics. We compare preferences of elective and emergency
patients estimated from pooled choice models with a full set of emergency patient dummy variables
interacted with all explanatory variables. There are 73,629 emergency patients in our sample. Only 20%
of emergency patients bypassed the nearest provider (see Appendix Figure A2). Descriptive statistics for
this patient group are reported in Appendix Table A3. Emergency patients’ choice sets are the 50 closest
providers who carried out hip replacement surgery on at least 30 emergency patients in this year. This
rules out private and specialised providers who only treat elective hip replacement patients. 708 (1.0%)
emergency patients were dropped because they attended a provider not in their choice set. All main
effects still pertain to the elective reference patient.
21We are not concerned about the implications of response rates for the hospital level case-mix adjusted OHS change scores as
these have been shown to be robust to variations in response rate (Gomes et al. forthcoming)
22As a check, we first re-estimate the responder only model with the addition of provider pre-operative response rates. The results
are robust to this sensitivity analysis, with the WTT of 1.4km (SE=0.102) for a standard deviation increase in PROM quality being
slightly larger than in our preferred specification (full results available on request).
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Table 3: Choice models allowing for patient pre-operative Oxford Hip Score
Patients with pre-op
OHS (1)
Patients with pre-op
OHS (2)
All patients (3)
Responders (3a) Non-responders (3b) Difference (3c)
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
Main effects
Distance (in km) -0.185 0.002*** -0.185 0.002*** -0.185 0.002*** -0.188 0.007*** 0.003 0.007
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000
NHS trust - medium -0.526 0.037*** -0.646 0.037*** -0.641 0.037*** -0.558 0.039*** -0.083 0.034*
NHS trust - multi-service -0.902 0.133*** -0.973 0.131*** -0.965 0.130*** -0.519 0.104*** -0.446 0.123***
NHS trust - small -0.820 0.045*** -0.907 0.045*** -0.902 0.044*** -0.857 0.045*** -0.045 0.041
NHS trust - specialist 1.052 0.079*** 0.869 0.082*** 0.856 0.082*** 0.973 0.089*** -0.117 0.070
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.039*** -0.503 0.039*** -0.489 0.039*** -0.608 0.039*** 0.119 0.038**
Independent sector treatment centre -1.373 0.065*** -1.499 0.063*** -1.515 0.063*** -1.670 0.067*** 0.155 0.059**
Primary care trust -0.978 0.223*** -1.301 0.223*** -1.298 0.224*** -1.272 0.235*** -0.026 0.232
Waiting time (in months) -0.011 0.020 0.035 0.020 0.033 0.020 -0.054 0.023* 0.087 0.018***
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.161 0.010*** 0.139 0.010*** 0.137 0.010*** 0.104 0.011*** 0.033 0.010**
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.050 0.006*** -0.046 0.006*** -0.046 0.006*** -0.052 0.006*** 0.006 0.006
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.135 0.035*** -0.068 0.032* -0.067 0.032* -0.014 0.036 -0.053 0.033
Response rate 2.044 0.093*** 2.038 0.092*** -2.287 0.080*** 4.325 0.086***
Interaction with pre-operative Oxford Hip Score
x Distance (in km) 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000***
x Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
x NHS trust - medium 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002
x NHS trust - multi-service -0.004 0.007 -0.006 0.007
x NHS trust - small -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002
x NHS trust - specialist 0.017 0.004*** 0.016 0.004***
x NHS trust - teaching -0.005 0.002* -0.008 0.002***
x Independent sector treatment centre 0.038 0.003*** 0.035 0.003***
x Primary care trust -0.002 0.008 -0.005 0.008
x Waiting time (in months) 0.004 0.001*** 0.004 0.001***
x Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.001
x 28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
x 28-day mortality rate (in %) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
x Response rate 0.020 0.005***
WTT(OHS change) 1.717 0.111*** 1.475 0.113*** 1.465 0.112*** 1.048 0.136*** 0.417 0.133**
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.941 0.107*** -0.867 0.105*** -0.879 0.105*** -0.932 0.132*** 0.054 0.127
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.474 0.122*** -0.238 0.112* -0.224 0.107* -0.045 0.113 -0.180 0.107
Number of patients 71,329 71,329 113,751
Number of providers 206 206 206
BIC 182,407 179,628 283,989
Pseudo R2 0.649 0.654 0.657
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2012. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate
are lagged by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Models
in (1) and (2) are for patients reporting a pre-operation OHS. Model in (3) is for all patients and interacts a dummy variable for reporting a pre-operation OHS. Interaction effects are reported in (3c).
All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard errors are
clustered at GP practice level.
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We report results for two different specifications. The first model in Table 4 compares emergency patients
with elective patients who choose NHS or independent providers. However, there are some marked
differences in observed characteristics between those two groups. For example, emergency patients are
on average 12 years older than elective patients and have over twice as many recorded comorbidities.
Hence in the second model reported in Table 5 we compare a set of elective and emergency patients
matched exactly on age, gender, past emergency admissions, number of comorbidities, income depriva-
tion and year of treatment. Additionally, we restrict the elective patient sample to those who used an
NHS provider that treats at least 30 elective and emergency patients in that year; hence the choice sets
are identical for elective and emergency conditional on location.
Table 4: Comparison of marginal utilities for elective and emergency patients
Elective patients Emergency patients Difference
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.184 0.002*** -0.217 0.004*** -0.033 0.003***
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.530 0.030*** -0.571 0.045*** -0.041 0.039
NHS trust - multi-service -0.603 0.099*** -0.935 0.164*** -0.332 0.145*
NHS trust - small -0.791 0.038*** -0.823 0.050*** -0.032 0.044
NHS trust - specialist 1.023 0.072*** n/a n/a
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.033*** -0.609 0.045*** -0.164 0.042***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.467 0.045*** n/a n/a
Primary care trust -1.159 0.206*** -1.274 0.258*** -0.115 0.176
Waiting time (in months) 0.013 0.015 -0.010 0.022 -0.023 0.021
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.118 0.008*** 0.048 0.013*** -0.070 0.012***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.052 0.004*** -0.046 0.008*** 0.006 0.007
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.031 0.026 0.056 0.056 0.087 0.057
WTT(OHS change) 1.285 0.085*** 0.523 0.143*** -0.763 0.126***
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.978 0.079*** -0.870 0.150*** 0.109 0.134
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.085 0.072 0.155 0.155 0.241 0.157
Number of patients 173,032 72,921
Number of providers 230 138
BIC 570,669
Pseudo R2 0.689
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective and emergency hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March
2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities for the ‘reference
patient’. Elective and emergency patients are not matched on observed characteristics but the ‘reference patient’ in both patient populations is
defined according to the average characteristics of the elective patient sample. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the
marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model is estimated with a full set of dummy variables interacted with hospital
characteristics and other interaction terms. All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities,
and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
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Table 5: Comparison of marginal utilities for elective and emergency patients - matched sample
Elective patients Emergency patients Difference
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.220 0.004*** -0.215 0.004*** 0.005 0.005
Distance2 0.001 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.709 0.050*** -0.560 0.046*** 0.149 0.053**
NHS trust - multi-service -0.710 0.175*** -0.921 0.182*** -0.211 0.213
NHS trust - small -0.880 0.058*** -0.794 0.053*** 0.086 0.062
NHS trust - teaching -0.468 0.053*** -0.598 0.048*** -0.130 0.058*
Primary care trust -1.133 0.292*** -1.429 0.314*** -0.296 0.282
Waiting time (in months) -0.087 0.027** -0.032 0.024 0.055 0.029
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.092 0.015*** 0.034 0.014* -0.058 0.016***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.061 0.009*** -0.046 0.008*** 0.015 0.010
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.050 0.061 0.070 0.063 0.120 0.079
WTT(OHS change) 0.796 0.128*** 0.354 0.142* -0.441 0.149**
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.893 0.129*** -0.814 0.152*** 0.079 0.165
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.084 0.102 0.140 0.127 0.224 0.148
Number of patients 32,274 32,274
Number of providers 138 138
BIC 107,831
Pseudo R2 0.771
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective and emergency hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013.
OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities for the ‘reference patient’.
Elective and emergency patients are matched exactly on observed characteristics (age, gender, past emergency utilisation in last year (none, once,
or more), income deprivation of neighbourhood, number of Elixhauser comorbit conditions, year of treatment) and the ‘reference patient’ in both
patient populations is defined according to the average (prior to matching) characteristics of the elective patient sample. Choice sets include only
providers that treat at least 30 elective and 30 emergency hip replacement patient in this period. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality
variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model is estimated with a full set of dummy variables interacted
with hospital characteristics and other interaction terms. All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser
comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
Both models suggest that emergency patients care less about provider OHS changes but have similar
preferences over the more traditional quality measures using readmission and mortality rates. In the
second specification, with closely matched patients, the estimated marginal utility of OHS changes
(βEmerq =0.034) is just over one third of that for elective patients (β
Elec
q =0.092) and significant at p<0.05.
If we assume that emergency patients’ demand is entirely inelastic to variation in observed elective
quality and that the estimated association for emergency patients is a result of omitted variables that
affect emergency and elective patients in the same way, then the difference in the marginal utility of OHS
changes (β∆q =0.058) can be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the true effect of OHS change
score on elective patient utility. The WTT for a one SD increase in OHS change scores then is 0.4km
(SE=0.149), which is smaller than that reported in Table 2.
Table 6 shows the main effects from our preferred specification estimated with additional hospital FEs.
We find that PROM quality still has a statistically significant effect on demand, whereas emergency
readmission rates no longer do. The WTT to travel for PROM quality is however 87% lower than that
calculated from the results in Table 2 (0.2km vs 1.3km). This is likely to be due to the fixed effect
absorbing part of the effect of time-invariant quality on choice. Results are broadly similar when patients’
choice sets are restricted to NHS hospitals, although we now find a counter-intuitive positive effect of
waiting time on demand.
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Table 6: Choice model controlling for unobserved time-invariant hospital effects
All providers (1) NHS providers only (2)
Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.202 0.002*** -0.231 0.003***
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000***
Waiting time (in months) 0.021 0.024 0.053 0.012***
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.017 0.006** 0.016 0.007*
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.004
28-day mortality rate (in %) 0.038 0.020 0.021 0.026
WTT(OHS change) 0.168 0.060** 0.124 0.055*
WTT(Readmission rate) 0.089 0.066 -0.0001 0.053
WTT(Mortality rate) 0.095 0.051 0.031 0.039
Number of patients 173,032 148,629
Number of providers 230 144
BIC 411,541 260,299
Pseudo R2 0.678 0.742
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and
March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged by one year. Coefficients are
marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at
the median distance (in km). Model in (1) does not impose restrictions on the type of provider in patients’ choice sets.
Model in (2) is based on a restricted choice set of NHS providers, thereby excluding patients that selected ISTCs. All
models include indicator variables for hospitals (not reported). All models also contain a full set of interactions of age,
gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported).
Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
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5. The economic effects of quality on demand
We use the results from choice models to illustrate the effect of quality differentiation on hospital demand.
Column four and five of Table 7 provide the marginal utilities of the different quality measures and the
willingness to travel for a one SD increase in these measures. The sixth and seventh columns show
the average total and relative change in demand from a one SD increase in quality, and column eight
gives the own quality demand elasticities. We base our calculations on the estimates for our preferred
specification in Table 2. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results presented in this
section.
Table 7: Effect sizes of hospital quality measures
Observed
Marginal
utility
Effect of SD increase in quality
Quality indicator Mean SD WTT
Demand
change
% Demand
change Elasticity
Change in Oxford Hip Score 19.8 1.4 0.118 1.3 33.9 9.4 1.3
Emergency readmission rate (in %) -5.6 2.4 -0.052 -1.0 -25.3 -7.0 -0.2
Mortality rate (in %) -0.2 0.4 -0.031 -0.1 -2.2 -0.6 0.0
Notes: All calculations based on estimated marginal utilities reported in Table 2. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal
utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Changes in volume and elasticities are averaged across hospital-year observations and
are weighted by predicted demand Ŷijt =
∑
i∈Mit
Pijt.
The expected increase in demand for a SD increase in OHS is approximately 34 patients, or 9.4% of
predicted demand at current quality levels. Increases in readmission and mortality rates are associated
with decreases in demand, although the association of mortality and demand is not statistically significant.
The effect of a one SD increase in OHS is larger than that of a one SD decrease in readmission rate.
There is substantial variation across providers in the effect of OHS change scores on own demand
(Figure 2). The estimated elasticities range from 0.2 to 2.4 (mean = 1.3). About 42% of the variation in
elasticities is explained by the amount of competition a provider faces, here measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)23. Providers in more competitive areas (low HHI) face larger quality elasticities
than those in less competitive areas (high HHI), with elasticities falling by approximately 0.29 per 0.1
increase in HHI (assuming a linear effect; p<0.001) (Figure 3). Markets are more competitive in areas
where independent sector treatment centres are active.
We also examine the effect of changes in the quality of other providers on a provider’s demand. Higher
cross-quality demand elasticities make it more likely that increases in one provider’s quality will trigger
an increase in the quality of other providers. Figure 4 shows how cross-quality elasticities decline rapidly
as the distances between providers increase. Whereas a 1% increase in a competitor’s PROM quality is
associated with a -0.63% reduction in demand if the competitor is located within 10 km, this reduces to
-0.23% when the competitor is 30km away. To put this into context, Santos et al. (forthcoming) report an
average cross-quality elasticity of demand for general practitioners in England of -0.04 (using a 10km
radius).
23The HHI for provider j is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of all providers j∗ = 1, . . . , J∗ that service LSOA
a = 1, . . . , A, here denoted as saj , weighted by the proportion of the provider’s observed total activity originating from this LSOA,
sja, so that
HHIj =
∑
a
sja ∗ [
∑
j∗
(saj∗ )
2] (10)
Hospital catchment areas are defined as all LSOAs within a radius of 30km around the hospital.
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Figure 2: Distribution of changes in hospital demand as a result of a SD increase in Oxford Hip
Score change scores and quality elasticity of demand
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Figure 3: Differences in quality elasticity of demand between providers in competitive (low HHI) and
non-competitive (high HHI) markets
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6. Discussion and concluding remarks
The collection of patient-reported outcome measures has been introduced in England with the ambition
that these new metrics of hospital quality would influence patient choice of hospital (Department of Health
2008). This paper is the first to test the relationship between observed hospital PROM quality and demand
for elective hip replacement surgery. It uses data on observed choices for all NHS-funded patients treated
between April 2010 and March 2013 in private and public hospitals in England. In order to address
potential endogeneity bias we implement an empirical strategy based on lagged explanatory variables,
hospital fixed effects and a control group design based on demand for emergency hip replacement.
Our results suggest that elective hospital demand is statistically significantly associated with observed
quality as measured by PROMs and other metrics. While individual patients are not very sensitive to
quality differences - the estimated willingness to travel for a standard deviation increase in PROM quality
is less than 1.3km - the number of potential patients in a hospital’s market implies that hospitals can
attract an increase in elective activity of approximately 34 new patients, or 9% of existing activity levels, if
they find ways to improve PROM quality by one standard deviation. Hospital demand is more responsive
to a one standard deviation of PROM quality than one standard deviation of emergency readmission
rates, and there is no statistically significant association with mortality rates after hip replacement surgery.
Our findings that choice responds to quality suggest that providers could compete on quality. However,
the change in activity that would arise after a change in quality may be modest. First, a standard deviation
increase in OHS (equivalent to 1.4 points) would be a substantial improvement in quality for any provider
and difficult to achieve. For comparison, the average year-on-year improvement in hospital PROM scores
is 0.196 OHS points, or less than 15% of the observed standard deviation. Second, we show that the
effect of quality changes on the providers’ ability to attract patients away from local competitors diminishes
rapidly as distance increases. This may result in local quasi-monopolies where quality improvements
have little effect on demand. Finally, our estimated effect is likely to be an upper bound estimate and
our analysis on emergency patients suggests that the coefficient of demand to quality could be up to
30% smaller. Taken together, the incentive effect of patients ‘voting with their feet’ and demanding higher
quality is likely to be limited.
There are several policy levers which may be used to ensure that PROM quality information is used to
inform hospital choice (Marshall et al. 2004; Faber et al. 2009). Many patients may still not know about
hospital PROM scores and more active dissemination to the general public may be required (e.g. by
adding the information to the Choose & Book system). Some patients may find it difficult to access this
information, for example if they do not have access to the internet. There is a lack of evidence on the
extent to which patients and general practitioners are aware of this information and consider it as part of
their decision-making process. Similarly, the information may not be sufficiently meaningful to them in
its current format. A recent study by Hildon et al. (2012) showed that a high proportion of patients and
doctors do not consider the reported PROMs to have an intuitive metric and thus struggle to interpret
provider scores. Finally, some patients may not consider variation between hospitals sufficiently large to
be considered important. Some of these points may resolve over time, whereas others require targeted
policy intervention to improve the dissemination of quality information.
We also explore whether patient preferences vary according to observed and unobserved patient
characteristics. We find that the preference for PROM quality increases with age and decreases with
income deprivation, comorbidity burden and past utilisation. Qualitatively similar results are obtained
for preferences for quality as approximated by emergency readmission rates. Interestingly, we do not
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find evidence that preferences for quality vary with pre-operative health status as reported by the patient
herself. But because healthier patients are more willing to travel, they have ceteris paribus a higher
willingness to travel for quality. Hence, the ‘distance bias’ described by Gowrisankaran and Town (1999)
is likely to occur not because more morbid patients request higher quality, but because they derive
different disutility from travel. This finding may be specific to the condition under study as osteoarthritis
and other conditions that require hip replacement reduce patients’ mobility, and more severely morbid
patients thus may be less able or willing to travel.
There remains scope for further research. For example, we cannot disentangle whether the estimated
effect is driven by patients’ choices versus general practitioners choices acting on their behalf. We
conjecture it is due to both. We also did not test whether the first release of PROM information in 2009/10
constituted news to patients and how this impacted on providers’ demand.
In conclusion, the results in this paper provide some first evidence to suggest that hospital demand for
hip replacement responds to hospital quality as captured by changes in patient-reported health status.
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Appendix
Table A1: Mixed logit choice model
Mean Standard deviation
Variable Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.184 0.002***
Distance2 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.530 0.030***
NHS trust - multi-service -0.603 0.099***
NHS trust - small -0.791 0.038***
NHS trust - specialist 1.023 0.072***
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.033***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.467 0.045***
Primary care trust -1.159 0.206***
Waiting time (in months) 0.013 0.015
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.118 0.008*** 0.000 0.001
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.052 0.004*** 0.000 0.001
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.031 0.026 -0.002 0.005
WTT(OHS change) 1.287 0.085***
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.981 0.079***
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.086 0.072
Number of patients 173,032
Number of providers 230
BIC 461,041
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Random coefficient (mixed) multinomial logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients
treated between April 2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are
lagged by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities. Random coefficients are specified for OHS change, readmis-
sion rate and mortality rate and estimates. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal
utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Interaction terms with patient characteristics not reported
(available on request). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level. The mean coefficients do differ from those
reported in Table 2 for the conditional logit model if there is less rounding.
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Table A2: Sensitivity analyses
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
Main effects
Distance (in km) -0.183 0.002*** -0.184 0.002*** -0.184 0.002*** -0.207 0.003***
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.508 0.032*** -0.530 0.030*** -0.540 0.031*** -0.643 0.036***
NHS trust - multi-service -0.656 0.090*** -0.615 0.099*** -0.612 0.097*** -0.604 0.098***
NHS trust - small -0.740 0.037*** -0.792 0.038*** -0.790 0.038*** -0.909 0.042***
NHS trust - specialist 1.019 0.071*** 1.002 0.072*** 1.065 0.073*** 1.047 0.083***
NHS trust - teaching -0.502 0.033*** -0.432 0.033*** -0.412 0.032*** -0.513 0.037***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.472 0.068*** -1.522 0.037*** -1.398 0.044***
Primary care trust -1.071 0.200*** -1.153 0.206*** -1.111 0.206*** -1.195 0.213***
Waiting time (in months) 0.033 0.018 -0.193 0.076* 0.007 0.015 -0.029 0.018
Change in PROM score 0.104 0.007*** 0.115 0.008*** 4.935 0.284*** 0.121 0.010***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.054 0.004*** -0.052 0.004*** -0.054 0.004*** -0.054 0.006***
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.044 0.024 -0.032 0.026 -0.026 0.026 0.033 0.035
Interaction with distance
x Patient age -0.001 0.000*** -0.002 0.000*** -0.002 0.000*** -0.002 0.000***
x Male 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002**
x Past utilisation -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002
x Comorbidity count -0.005 0.001*** -0.004 0.001*** -0.003 0.001*** -0.001 0.001
x Income deprivation -0.179 0.015*** -0.186 0.017*** -0.189 0.018*** -0.241 0.022***
Interaction with waiting time
x Patient age 0.003 0.000*** 0.008 0.002** 0.003 0.000*** 0.003 0.001***
x Male -0.018 0.010 -0.068 0.051 -0.010 0.009 0.001 0.012
x Past utilisation -0.005 0.012 0.049 0.059 -0.007 0.012 0.008 0.013
x Comorbidity count -0.036 0.007*** -0.057 0.033 -0.018 0.007** -0.016 0.007*
x Income deprivation 0.032 0.086 1.180 0.458* 0.083 0.084 0.007 0.107
Interaction with change in PROM score
x Patient age 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000* 0.047 0.010*** 0.001 0.000
x Male 0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.005 -0.300 0.214 -0.002 0.006
x Past utilisation -0.014 0.006* -0.008 0.007 -0.327 0.240 -0.012 0.007
x Comorbidity count -0.009 0.003** -0.009 0.003** -0.475 0.128*** -0.004 0.004
x Income deprivation -0.389 0.046*** -0.448 0.047*** -18.634 1.698*** -0.568 0.056***
Interaction with 28-day emergency readmission rate
x Patient age 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000**
x Male 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.004
x Past utilisation 0.012 0.004** 0.012 0.003*** 0.012 0.004*** 0.010 0.004**
x Comorbidity count 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
x Income deprivation 0.082 0.026** 0.124 0.026*** 0.138 0.026*** 0.121 0.034***
Interaction with 28-day mortality rate
x Patient age -0.002 0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
x Male -0.051 0.021* -0.053 0.022* -0.049 0.022* -0.058 0.031
x Past utilisation 0.039 0.030 0.049 0.026 0.047 0.026 0.060 0.032
x Comorbidity count -0.001 0.015 -0.010 0.015 -0.009 0.015 -0.004 0.018
x Income deprivation -0.059 0.172 -0.023 0.168 -0.049 0.167 -0.230 0.210
WTT(PROM change) 1.174 0.086*** 1.261 0.086*** 1.284 0.076*** 1.078 0.089***
WTT(Readmission rate) -1.042 0.081*** -0.983 0.080*** -1.034 0.079*** -0.824 0.089***
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.125 0.067 -0.091 0.073 -0.074 0.074 0.055 0.059
Number of patients 176,471 173,032 171,737 148,629
Number of providers 233 230 225 144
BIC 473,568 460,956 450,787 299,221
Pseudo R2 0.645 0.637 0.639 0.701
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013. PROM change,
waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged by one year if not otherwise stated. Coefficients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of
the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Interaction terms with distance2 and
provider type not reported (available on request). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
Model (1) - PROM change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are contemporaneous. Based on observed choices for patients treated
between April 2009 and March 2012. Since April 2012 PROM scores have been reported separately for primary and revision hip replacement surgeries,
so that our measures of PROM quality are no longer comparable.
Model (2) - Proportion of patients waiting longer than 120 days substituted for waiting time (both lagged).
Model (3) - Lagged EQ-5D change scores substituted for lagged OHS change scores.
Model (4) - Patients’ choice sets exclude independent sector treatment centres.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics - emergency sample
Variable Obs Mean SD ICC
Patient characteristics
Distance travelled (in km) 73,629 14.2 27.1
Distance travelled past closest provider (in km) 73,629 4.2 25.4
Number of providers within 10km radius 73,629 1.0 1.4
Number of providers within 30km radius 73,629 5.4 5.4
Age 73,629 80.9 9.8
Male 73,629 0.27 0.44
Past utilisation 73,629 0.65 1.17
Number of Elixhauser conditions 73,629 0.99 1.56
Income deprivation 73,629 0.14 0.10
Provider characteristics
Observed volume 394 186.9 87.1 80.7%
Waiting time (in months) 394 3.0 0.7 46.1%
Change in Oxford Hip Score 394 19.4 1.3 49.1%
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 394 5.99 2.2o 38.2%
28-day mortality rate (in %) 394 0.20 0.25 5.3%
Obs = Observations; SD = Standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient.
Notes: Patient characteristics for patients choosing provider between April 2010 and March 2013. Provider
waiting time, change in Oxford Hip Score, readmission rate, mortality rate are based on elective patients
treated by the respective providers and are for financial years 2009/10 to 2011/12.
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Figure A1: Waiting time for elective hip replacement surgery in England - 2000 to 2012
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Figure A2: Percentage of emergency patients who went to their Nth nearest hospital
